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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
x
SONYA GORBEA
Plaintiff
-against-
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
11-CV-3758 (KAM)(LB)
VERIZON NEW YORK, INC.,
Defendant.
x
MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Sonya Gorbea brings this action against her 
employer, Verizon New York, Inc., alleging employment 
discrimination and retaliation on the basis of her alleged 
disabilities of back sprain since 2001 and asthma since 2007, in 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
12101 et seq. ("ADA") and the New York City Human Rights Law, 
Administrative Code § 8-107 et seq. ("NYCHRL"). (See generally
Am. Compl., ECF No. 7.) Presently before the court are 
plaintiff and defendant's respective motions for summary 
judgment, made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
(Pl. Mot., ECF No. 26; Def. Mot., ECF No. 36.) As set forth 
below, plaintiff's motion is denied in its entirety, and 
defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part. The 
parties shall appear for a status conference on April 2, 2014 at 
12pm to discuss a May trial date.
AUTHENTIC. 
U.S. GOVERNI 
INFORMAT]
Case 1:11-cv-03758-KAM-LB Document 46 Filed 03/10/14 Page 2 of 33 PagelD  #: <pageID>
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn primarily from the 
parties' statements made pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1.1 
("Pl. 56.1 Stmt.," ECF No. 28; "Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt.," ECF No. 
41; "Def. 56.1 Stmt.," ECF No. 38; "Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt.," ECF 
No. 35.) Except where noted, the facts are undisputed. In 
addition, as will be discussed further below, much of the 
documentary evidence the parties offer in support of their 
claims is inadmissible and is therefore not referenced in this 
fact section. See Bey v. City of New York, No. 99-CV-3873, 2009 
WL 2033066, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009) (citing Sarno v.
Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, 183 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir.
1999)) ("Plaintiffs correctly note that inadmissible evidence, 
such as hearsay not subject to any exception, cannot be used to 
support a summary judgment motion."); see also Faulkner v.
Arista Records LLC, 797 F. Supp. 2d 299, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(noting that it is "the rule that 'only admissible evidence' 
need be considered on summary judgment'" and that the 
"principles governing admissibility of evidence do not change on
1 Local Civil Rule 56.1 provides that a party moving for summary judgment 
shall annex[] to the notice of motion a separate, short and concise 
statement," "of the material facts to which the moving party contends there 
is no genuine issue to be tried." The party opposing the motion must 
"include a correspondingly numbered paragraph responding to each numbered 
paragraph in the statement of the moving party" with the opposition. Each of 
these paragraphs must cite to admissible evidence. Local Civ. R. 56.1(a)- 
(c).
2
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a motion for summary judgment." (quoting Raskin v. Wyatt Co.,
125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1997))).
Plaintiff began working for defendant in 1997, and 
became a field technician in 1999. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 1; Def.
56.1 Stmt. 5 3.) Verizon's job description for field 
technicians includes, but is not limited to, the requirements of 
climbing ladders and, in some areas, poles, and moving or 
lifting 100 or more pounds. (Field Technician description of 
duties at 2; Casher Decl. Ex. C.)2 On October 15, 2001, 
plaintiff suffered an on-the-job injury while moving a ladder 
and was diagnosed with "lumbosacral sprain." (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 
2, Ex. 1) Following this injury, plaintiff began to suffer 
intermittent back problems. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. 5 11.) Defendant 
placed plaintiff on "light duty status," limiting the amount 
plaintiff had to climb, lift or carry, for various periods of 
time after this injury, but it is not clear from the record what 
light duty entailed. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 3; Def. R. 56.1 Stmt.
5 13.) Plaintiff was most recently placed on light duty status 
from March 20, 2007 to February 28, 2011. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 3.) 
In 2009, plaintiff took three or four weeks of medical leave due 
to back pain, but otherwise did not require medical leave from 
approximately 2005 to 2009. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. 55 15-16.)
2 "Casher Decl." refers to the Declaration of Scott H. Casher, counsel for 
defendant, ECF No. 39.
3
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In addition to her back injury, plaintiff also asserts 
that she is disabled as a result of her asthma. According to 
plaintiff, she developed asthma in 2007. There is no evidence 
that plaintiff notified defendant or requested any accommodation 
for her asthma until July 2010. (See Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 5; Def.
56.1 Stmt. 10-11.) On July 7, 2010, plaintiff requested an 
air-conditioned work vehicle, stating that the temperature in 
her assigned truck exacerbated her asthma. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 5; 
Def. R. 56.1 Stmt. 5 18.) Plaintiff's supervisors did not 
provide her with an air-conditioned truck. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 
7.) Plaintiff was absent from work from July 7, 2010, the date 
of her air-conditioned truck request, to July 26, 2010, and 
defendant granted plaintiff a Family Medical and Leave Act 
accommodation due to her asthma on August 5, 2010, but it is not
clear from the record what the accommodation was, (Pl. 56.1 
Stmt. 55 9-10.)
The parties disagree about whether an air-conditioned 
truck was in fact available for plaintiff to use. (See Pl. 56.1
5 8; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. 5 8.) During her deposition, 
plaintiff stated that she observed available air-conditioned 
trucks, but estimated that, at the time of her request, only one
4
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to two percent of defendant's trucks had air-conditioning. 
(Gorbea Dep. Tr. at 47, 160; see also Def. R. 56.1 5 22.)3
Shortly thereafter, in July or August of 2010, 
defendant transferred plaintiff and other employees on light 
duty to its air-conditioned Flatbush Extension facility to 
perform office work. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 11; Def. 56.1 Stmt. 5 
23.) Plaintiff continued to work at the Flatbush Extension 
building through October 2010. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. 5 26.) During 
this period, specifically on September 9, 2010 and October 12, 
2010, defendant noted plaintiff's good work attendance. (Pl.
56.1 Stmt. 5 13.)
On October 14, 2010, defendant informed the employees 
in the office in which plaintiff worked that the office would be 
fumigated that evening in order to rid the space of bed bugs. 
(Def. 56.1 Stmt. 5 27.) Plaintiff was not present during the 
fumigation; however, the following day at the office, she had 
difficulty breathing and exited the office to use her inhaler. 
(Def. 56.1 Stmt. 55 27-29; Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. 5 28.) 
Plaintiff's manager permitted her to leave work in order to 
receive medical attention and assisted her in filing an incident 
report. Plaintiff was absent from work for several days
3 "Gorbea Dep. Tr." refers to the transcript of plaintiff's deposition, held 
on May 29, 2012. Both plaintiff and defendant have filed copies of the 
transcript of plaintiff's deposition. While neither party has provided the
complete transcript to the court, defendant has submitted a much lengthier 
portion of the transcript and the court will therefore refer to that version, 
located at Exhibit B to the Casher Declaration, ECF No. 39-2.
5
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thereafter. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 17; Def. 56.1 Stmt. 30-31.) 
According to the doctor's report associated with plaintiff's 
worker's compensation claim, plaintiff saw her doctor on October 
15, October 19, October 22, October 29, and November 6, 2010, in 
addition to an emergency room visit on October 26. (Vadhan 
Rep., Pl. Ex. 8, ECF No. 29-8.) Plaintiff's doctor diagnosed 
her with reactive airway dysfunction syndrome and bronchospasm 
and recommended that plaintiff return to work on December 7,
2010 and limit her exposure to chemicals, dust and high 
temperatures. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 15; Pl. Ex. 8; see also Def. 
Resp. 56.1 Stmt. 5 15 (defendant appears to dispute the severity 
of plaintiff's symptoms but not the doctor's diagnoses).)
Following the above incident, plaintiff was absent 
from work for several days, including for several hours on 
October 18, 2010. Plaintiff claims that October 18 was a pre­
approved vacation day, but the documentation she submitted does 
not established that she was on pre-approved leave on October
18. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 17; Def. 56.1 Stmt. 5 32.) Defendant 
suspended plaintiff for 30 days, from October 21, 2010 to 
December 6, 2010, stating that plaintiff's several-hour absence 
on October 18 was unauthorized. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. 5 32.)4 A
4 The parties' respective positions on whether or not plaintiff was authorized 
to be absent from work on October 18, 2010 are wholly unclear. Plaintiff 
states in her Rule 56.1 statement that she had been granted a vacation day, a 
fact that defendant admits in its responsive statement. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 1 
17; Def. 56.1 Stmt. 5 17.) There is, however, no evidence on the record
6
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Workers' Compensation Board hearing was held on February 25,
2011 and the Board, on March 2, 2011, subsequently authorized 
plaintiff's medical care but found that plaintiff's "lost time 
claimed was due to her being suspended and unrelated to her 
medical condition." (Pl. Ex. 9, ECF No. 29-9.)
On or about October 29, 2010, during her suspension, 
plaintiff requested that she be provided with ergonomic 
equipment for her desk, and submitted her treating physician's 
letter dated October 29, 2010 in support. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5
19. ) Plaintiff continued to have back pain when she returned to 
work and, on December 17, 2010, requested to go home because she 
was in too much pain to continue working. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5
20. ) Since that date, plaintiff has been on medical leave.
(Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 29; Def. 56.1 Stmt. 55 37-39.)
Although she has not submitted any admissible evidence 
to support this point, plaintiff asserts, and defendant agrees, 
that, on March 1, 2011, "Defendant was informed that Plaintiff 
could return to work with similar restrictions to those she had
that, as of October 18, plaintiff was given permission to take a vacation day 
and defendant's briefing indicates that it does not in fact concede that 
plaintiff was given such permission. (See, e.g., Def. Mem. 16.) Plaintiff 
has also submitted what appears to be some type of record from Verizon in 
support of her position that she was permitted to be absent from work on 
October 18; however, these records are unsworn (indeed, their provenance is 
unclear), and thus inadmissible, and, in any event, support a finding that 
plaintiff was suspended for tardiness. Further, plaintiff states in her 
responsive 56.1 statement that she attempted to come to work on October 18 
but that she was unable to do so because of her health. (Pl. Resp. 56.1 
Stmt. 1 32; see also Gorbea Dep. Tr. at 74-75 (discussing this absence as 
health related).)
7
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previously in the field or to an office with the ergonomic 
accommodations previously requested so long as her return was 
gradual." (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 21; Def. 56.1 Stmt. 5 21.) Again, 
the record is void of any evidence of what restrictions 
plaintiff had been granted in the field.
Most of the other circumstances surrounding 
plaintiff's current medical leave and condition are in dispute. 
Plaintiff states that Verizon decided in May of 2011 that it 
could not accommodate plaintiff in either the field or an 
office, and that a possible accommodation existed (though not 
within the plaintiff's requested time restrictions) but that 
this accommodation was never communicated to plaintiff. (Pl.
56.1 Stmt. 55 22-23, 26.) Defendant asserts that there were no 
office assignments available for any light-duty technicians by 
March 2011, citing only plaintiff's deposition testimony that 
the light-duty technicians she knew at the Flatbush Extension 
were now back in the field. Defendant submitted no other 
admissible evidence in support of its contention that office 
assignments were no longer available as of March 2011. (Def. 
Resp. 56.1 Stmt. 55 22-23 (citing Gorbea Dep. Tr. at 92-94).) 
Defendant further denies plaintiff's claim that light duty 
assignments in the field are available to plaintiff, asserting 
only that plaintiff admitted that she lacked personal knowledge 
about other light duty assignments. (Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. 5
8
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27.) Again, defendant failed to submit any other admissible 
evidence regarding the availability, or lack thereof, of light 
duty field assignments.
The most recent medical documentation in the record 
regarding plaintiff's health is a July 11, 2011 medical report 
following an exam performed by Dr. Stanley Soren on the same 
day. The report indicates that, as a result of the 2001 injury, 
plaintiff continued to have a previously diagnosed lumbosacral 
sprain that constitutes "a minimal mild temporary partial 
disability" with a "guarded to good" prognosis. (Soren Rep. at 
5.) During the exam, plaintiff complained of "low back spasms, 
which come and go with 'paralysis of the legs' for three minutes 
at a time." (Soren Rep. at 2). The doctor recommended home 
exercise, a supervised weight reduction program and that 
plaintiff could "return to work in a light-duty capacity, 
avoiding repetitive bending, twisting, pushing, pulling, 
climbing or lifting more than an occasional 25 pounds." (Soren 
Rep. at 5.)
Plaintiff testified during her May 29, 2012 deposition 
that she continues to spend time "resting her back" and that she
5 "Soren Rep." refers to Dr. Soren's July 11, 2011 report, which is labeled as 
Exhibit 1 to the Affirmation of Jesse C. Rose, plaintiff's counsel. Dr.
Soren swore to the contents of the report under penalty of perjury and, 
therefore, the report is admissible. See Quintero v. Rite Aid of N.Y., No.
09-CV-6084, 2011 WL 5529818, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1746; LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & McRae, L.L.P. v. Worsham, 185 F.3d 61, 65-66 
(2d Cir. 1999)).
9
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requires breaks when walking or sitting in a standard chair. 
(Gorbea Dep. Tr. at 107, 163-64.) She also testified that she 
cannot lift more than twenty pounds and that she is unable to 
climb. (Gorbea Dep. Tr. at 140, 156.) However, plaintiff also 
stated that she was able to exercise by walking on the treadmill 
three times a week and doing water aerobics, climb the stairs of 
her home, and perform housework, such as vacuuming and steam 
cleaning. (Gorbea Dep. Tr. at 105-06, 149, 165.) During her 
deposition, Ms. Gorbea did not describe any current limitations 
on her activities due to her asthma.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
A court may grant summary judgment only if "the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A fact is 'material' for these purposes 
when it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the 
governing law.'" Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549,
553 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). "An issue of fact is 'genuine' if 'the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 
for the nonmoving party.'" Id. Moreover, no genuine issue of 
material fact exists "unless there is sufficient evidence 
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for
10
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that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, . . . or is
not significantly probative, . . . summary judgment may be
granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations 
omitted). In evaluating whether the moving party has shown that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, "only admissible 
evidence need be considered by the [district] court in ruling on 
[the] motion." Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 
Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 264 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
The moving party carries the burden of demonstrating 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court must construe 
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
all reasonable inferences and ambiguities must be resolved 
against the moving party. Flanigan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 242 F.3d 
78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). In opposing a motion for summary
judgment, a nonmoving party cannot rest on "mere allegations or 
denials" but must instead "set forth specific facts showing 
there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see 
also Harlen Assocs. v. Incorporated Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 
494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[M]ere speculation and conjecture is 
[sic] insufficient to preclude the granting of the 
motion."); Nat'l Westminster Bank USA v. Ross, 676 F.Supp. 48,
51 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Speculation, conclusory allegations, and
11
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mere denials are not enough to raise genuine issues of fact."). 
Moreover, as previously discussed, the facts put forth in 
support of a motion for summary judgment must be corroborated by 
admissible evidence. See Faulkner, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
Where, as here, cross-motions for summary judgment are 
made, the standard is the same as that for individual motions 
for summary judgment. See Morales v. Quintel Entm't, Inc., 249 
F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001). Each motion must be considered
independently of the other and, when evaluating each, the court 
must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non­
moving party. Id. The parties have moved for summary judgment 
on each of plaintiff's claims: that defendant failed to provide 
plaintiff with reasonable accommodation, that defendant 
retaliated against plaintiff, and that defendant failed to 
engage in the required interactive process with plaintiff. The 
accommodation and retaliation claims will be addressed in turn, 
and, for the reasons explained below, the interactive process 
claim need not be addressed at this time.
II. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation
The ADA provides that "not making reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability" constitutes 
discrimination "unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
12
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the business." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A). The NYCHRL
also provides that it is unlawful for "an employer or employee 
or agent thereof, because of the actual of perceived . . .
disability . . . of any person, . . . to discriminate against
such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment." N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a). 
Further, "any person prohibited by the provisions of this 
section from discrimination on the basis of disability shall 
make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a 
disability to satisfy the essential requisites of a job." § 8- 
107(15)(a).
In order to make a prima facie case that an employer 
has engaged in discrimination by failing to make reasonable 
accommodations under either the ADA or the NYCHRL,6 plaintiff 
must establish that "(1) [she] is a person with a disability 
under the meaning of the [the statute]; (2) an employer covered 
by the statute had notice of [her] disability; (3) with 
reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential
6 "The elements to find discrimination under the . . . NYCHRL generally track
the ADA." Ugactz v. United Parcel Serv. , No. 10-CV-1247, 2013 WL 1232355, at 
*14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013) (citing Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d
151, 158 (2d Cir. 2010); Primmer v. CBS Studios, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 248,
261-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). However, in amending the Human Rights Law in 2005,
the New York City Council made clear that the law must "be construed 
liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes 
thereof, regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human 
rights laws, including those with provisions comparably-worded to provisions 
of this title[,] have been so construed." Mihalik v. Credit Agricole 
Cheuvreux N. Am., 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Local Civil 
Rights Restoration Act of 2005 § 7, N.Y.C. Local L. No. 85)).
13
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functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused 
to make such accommodations." Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of 
N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 478-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting 
Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., Inc., 457 F.3d 181, 183-84 (2d Cir.
2006)). If a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case for 
discrimination, "the burden shifts to the employer to 
demonstrate that the employee's proposed accommodation would 
result in an undue hardship." Scalera v. Electrograph Sys., 
Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d 352, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing, inter 
alia, Stone v. City of Mt. Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir.
1997)). Because defendant disputes that plaintiff can 
demonstrate that she is disabled, that she could perform her job 
with reasonable accommodation and that defendant refused to 
accommodate plaintiff (see Def. Mem. 7-16), the evidence each 
party has adduced for these three elements will be considered in 
turn.
Plaintiff claims that defendant failed to accommodate 
her asthma and back injury by not providing her with an air- 
conditioned truck or ergonomic office equipment and by not 
providing plaintiff with an alternative to remaining on medical 
leave since December of 2010, in violation of the ADA and the 
NYCHRL. (See generally Am. Compl.) For the reasons stated 
below, plaintiff's motion as to her accommodation claims is 
denied. Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in
14
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part; there is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff 
is not disabled due to her asthma, but issues of fact remain 
about whether plaintiff is disabled due to her back sprain and 
whether defendant could accommodate plaintiff's alleged 
disability due to her back sprain.
a. Whether plaintiff has a disability
The parties disagree about whether plaintiff is 
disabled under the meaning of the ADA and the NYCHRL. The ADA 
defines disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being 
regarded as having such an impairment."7 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
Plaintiff identifies a lumbosacral sprain and asthma as two 
physical impairments that she contends limit the major life 
activities of "repetitive bending, twisting, pushing, pulling, 
climbing, lifting, and breathing," as well as working. (Pl.
Mem. 9-10.) All of these activities are included in the ADA's
7 Plaintiff claims both that she has a disability under the meaning of the ADA 
and NYCHRL and that she was regarded as having a disability. The court will 
not examine the question of whether defendant regarded plaintiff as having a 
disability for two reasons. First, it is an unsettled question in this 
Circuit whether an employer must accommodate an employee who is perceived as 
having but does not in fact have a disability. See Cameron v. Cmty. Aid for 
Retarded Children, 335 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2003) (declining to decide this
question and noting the split in opinion of other circuits on this issue); 
see also Petrone v. Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 03-CV-4359, 2013 
WL 3491057, at *27 n.12 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2013) (noting that this question
remains undecided in the Second Circuit). Second, while a perceived 
disability might be more directly relevant to plaintiff's retaliation claim, 
other issues of fact bar finding for either party on plaintiff's retaliation 
claim, as will be discussed further below.
15
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non-exhaustive list of major life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(2)(A). Although the ADA itself does not define what 
constitutes a "substantial limitation," the regulations 
promulgated under the statute state a substantial limitation is 
one that "substantially limits the ability of an individual to 
perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the 
general population," but it "need not prevent, or significantly 
or severely restrict, the individual from performing [that] 
major life activity." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii). The 
substantial limitation standard "is not meant to be a demanding" 
one, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i), and the statute mandates that the 
definition of disability "be construed in favor of broad 
coverage of individuals," 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).8 Disability 
is more broadly defined under the NYCHRL as "any physical, 
medical, mental or psychological impairment, or a history or 
record of such impairment." N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(16)(a); 
see also Debell v. Maimonides Med. Ctr., No. 09-CV-3491, 2011 WL 
4710818, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (collecting cases and
As plaintiff notes, the statutory definition of disability was broadened by 
the ADA Amendments Act ("ADAAA"), effective January 1, 2009. The Second
Circuit has determined that the statute does not apply retroactively. See 
Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 381 Fed. Appx. 85, 87 n.2 (2d Cir. 
2010); see also Petrone, 2013 WL 3491057, at *17 n.9; Widomski v. State Univ. 
of N.Y. (SUNY) at Orange, 933 F. Supp. 2d 534, 542-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(collecting cases addressing the question of the ADAAA's retroactivity). 
Although plaintiff is unclear about the precise period of time she contends 
defendant failed to accommodate her lumbosacral sprain and asthma, it appears 
that her complaint concerns incidents after 2009 and that the amended statute 
applies.
16
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comparing the respective definitions of disability under the 
NYCHRL and ADA).
i. Whether plaintiff's lumbosacral sprain 
constitutes a disability
The court will first examine the question of whether 
plaintiff's lumbosacral sprain constitutes a disability under 
the ADA and NYCHRL. In support of her contention that certain 
major life activities are substantially limited by her back 
condition, plaintiff submits the following admissible evidence: 
plaintiff's own affidavit, which contains little detail about 
her physical limitations as related to her back, her deposition 
testimony, and Dr. Soren's report. Defendant, in making its 
summary judgment motion, relies primarily on plaintiff's 
deposition testimony to argue that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact that plaintiff is not disabled.
The admissible evidence creates a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether plaintiff is limited by her back 
condition in the major life activities of bending, twisting, 
pushing, pulling, climbing, and lifting, thus precluding summary 
judgment in favor of either party on this issue. On one hand, 
Dr. Soren, who evaluated plaintiff on July 11, 2011, opined that 
plaintiff had a lumbrosacral sprain that constituted a "minimal 
mild temporary partial disability," which would permit her to 
return to work "in a light-duty capacity, avoiding repetitive
17
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bending, twisting, pushing, pulling, climbing or lifting more 
than an occasional 25 pounds." (Soren Rep. 5.) Although the 
doctor noted some lumbrosacral tenderness and reduced range of 
spinal motion compared to normal, his prognosis for plaintiff 
was "guarded to good." (Soren Rep. 4-5.)
On the other hand, plaintiff testified during her more 
recent deposition, on May 29, 2012, that she is able to do water 
aerobics and walk on the treadmill three times a week. (Gorbea 
Dep. Tr. at 105-06.) She also explained that, with breaks, she 
could stand, sit in a chair, and lift items that are not "too 
heavy." (Gorbea Dep. Tr. at 163-64.) In addition, Ms. Gorbea 
testified that she was able to walk up the stairs to the second 
floor of her house and down the stairs to the basement. (Gorbea 
Dep. Tr. at 165.) It is unclear from the above information 
whether plaintiff's ability to bend, twist, push, pull, climb or 
lift is in fact substantially limited compared to the general 
population, although Dr. Soren states that plaintiff's back 
impairment is a disability. See, e.g., Cortes v. Sky Chefs, 
Inc., 67 Fed. Appx. 66, 68 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding the
district court's determination that a plaintiff's inability to 
lift more than ten pounds did not substantially limit the major 
life activity of lifting). In light of this evidence, there 
remain issues of fact as to whether plaintiff is substantially
18
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limited in her ability to bend, twist, push, pull, climb, and 
lift due to her lumbosacral sprain.9
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted 
with respect to whether plaintiff's back injury limits the major 
life activity of working, however. Although plaintiff did not 
plead that she was limited in her ability to work in general, 
the court will nonetheless consider this recent claim because it 
is asserted in plaintiff's briefing and defendant has responded 
to it. (See Am. Compl. 5 17 (alleging only that plaintiff is 
limited "in which she can lift and/or push" due to her back 
injury).) Even viewing all the facts in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact that the plaintiff is not substantially limited in 
her ability to work. In order to be considered disabled in 
reference to the major life activity of working under the ADA, a 
plaintiff must be able to demonstrate at trial that "[her] 
impairment disqualifies [her] from either a particular class of 
jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, as compared to 
a non-impaired person of similar training, skill, and 
experience." Gaines v. N.Y.C. Trans. Auth., 528 F. Supp. 2d
9 Although there are questions of material fact as to plaintiff's limitations 
due to her lumbosacral sprain, she does meet the definition of disability 
under the NYCHRL. As noted previously, the NYCHRL's definition of disability 
is broad, encompassing any physical impairment. Defendant has acknowledged 
that plaintiff's back was injured, that she required light duty for at least 
periods of her employment and that she suffers from "back problems." (Def. 
Resp. 56.1 Stmt. 11 1, 3; Def. 56.1 Stmt. 1 10.) Plaintiff therefore 
established that her back problems are deemed a disability under the NYCHRL.
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135, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing, inter alia, 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(j)(3)(i)).10 There is simply no evidence on the record, 
admissible or otherwise, that plaintiff is so limited.
Therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is 
granted as to plaintiff's claim that she is substantially 
limited by her back condition in her ability to engage int eh 
major life activity of working. For the same reasons, 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as it pertains to 
plaintiff's back impairment and its effect on the major life 
activity of working is denied.
ii. Whether plaintiff's asthma constitutes a 
disability
Although questions remain about the limitations caused 
by plaintiff's lumbosacral sprain, plaintiff is unable to 
demonstrate that she is disabled as a result of her asthma. 
Therefore, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on her claims 
that she should have been accommodated due to her asthma is 
denied, and defendant's motion as to those same claims is 
granted. Plaintiff has submitted no admissible evidence to 
demonstrate that her breathing is substantially limited as to 
her asthma, with the exception of her deposition testimony and 
her affidavit, which is, again, not particularly illuminating as
10 Although the current version of the relevant EEOC regulations no longer 
defines a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working, the 
Second Circuit has continued to use the definition from the previous version 
of the regulations. See Cardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 473 Fed. Appx. 
21, 24 (2d Cir. 2012).
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to whether plaintiff is substantially limited due to asthma.11 
In her deposition, plaintiff does not discuss any substantial 
difficulty breathing, but rather testified in the following 
manner:
Q: Would you say that you are able to perform all of the
regular major life activities without any issues connected 
to your asthma?
A: Yes.
Q: You know, things that we do every day?
A: Yes.
(Gorbea Dep. Tr. at 162.) Although at another point in her 
deposition, plaintiff described trouble breathing in the past 
that she attributed to her work-assigned truck (Gorbea Dep. Tr. 
at 20-22), and it is undisputed that plaintiff has asthma, this 
evidence is not sufficient to establish that plaintiff is 
disabled due to asthma. See Burke v. Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corp., 142 Fed. Appx. 527, 529 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that 
"asthma does not invariably impair a major life activity" and 
finding in part due to the fact that plaintiff's asthma attacks 
were infrequent that she was not disabled under the ADA); 
Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 207 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) ("Because one plaintiff with asthma is substantially
11 Although plaintiff has included a sworn report from Dr. Deepak Vadhan, who 
examined plaintiff after she had difficulty breathing as a result of the 
fumes from the bed bug fumigation in the Flatbush Extension, this report 
details plaintiff's reaction to those fumes, and states that she should avoid 
exposure to chemicals, high temperatures and dust, but does not speak to her 
underlying asthma condition or any substantial limitations due to asthma.
(See Pl. Ex. 8, ECF No. 29-8.) The report, though admissible, does not 
therefore address the question of plaintiff's disability due to asthma.
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limited in the major life activity of breathing does not mean 
that every plaintiff with asthma has a qualifying disability 
under the ADA."). Even under the more expansive standard of the 
ADAAA plaintiff's asthma does not substantially limit her 
breathing and plaintiff's own testimony precludes any issue of 
fact on this point. For these reasons, plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment on plaintiff's accommodation claims related to 
her asthma is denied and defendant's motion regarding 
plaintiff's disability due to her asthma is granted.
Although plaintiff likely meets the more expansive 
standard for disability due to her asthma under the NYCHRL, the 
court declines to undertake this analysis because plaintiff's 
accommodation claims as to her asthma are not cognizable under 
the federal statute.
b. Whether plaintiff is able to perform the essential 
functions of her job with or without accommodation
In addition to disputing whether or not plaintiff has
a disability, the parties disagree as to whether plaintiff is
able to perform the essential functions of her job, with or
without accommodation. Essential functions of a position are
"the fundamental job duties of the employment position the
individual with a disability holds or desires." 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(n). An employer's view of what constitutes an essential
function of a job should be given "considerable deference,"
22
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McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013), 
there are a number of other factors courts must consider when 
engaging in this analysis, including: "[w]ritten job 
descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing 
applicants for the job;" "[t]he amount of time on the job 
performing the function;" "[t]he consequences of not requiring 
the incumbent to perform the function;" "[t]he work experience 
of past incumbents in the job;" and "[t]he current work 
experience of incumbents in similar jobs." 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(n)(3). "Determining whether physical qualifications are 
essential functions of a job requires," therefore, "the court to 
engage in a highly fact-specific inquiry. . . . Such a
determination should be based on more than statements in a job 
description and should reflect the actual functioning and 
circumstances of the particular enterprise involved." Welch v. 
United Postal Serv., 871 F. Supp. 2d 164, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(internal citation omitted) (emphasis in the original).
Defendant has submitted the only evidence in the 
record addressing the essential functions of plaintiff's 
position, a job description for field technicians. (Casher 
Decl. Ex. C.) Verizon has failed to submit an affidavit from a 
Verizon employee with knowledge of this job description to 
attest to its authenticity and accuracy. Assuming that 
defendant could provide such a statement and, in the absence of
23
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other contrary, admissible evidence, the court would accept that 
this document represents the essential functions of the field 
technician job, notwithstanding plaintiff's argument that the 
fact that some employees were on modified duty indicates 
otherwise. See McMillan, 711 F.3d at 126 (discussing the 
"considerable deference" due to an employer's determination 
about a job's essential functions); Welch, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 
186 (agreeing that an employee's modified job duties do not 
necessarily speak to a job's essential functions).
c. Whether defendant could have reasonably accommodated
plaintiff
The final disputed element of plaintiff's 
accommodation claim is whether defendant could reasonably 
accommodate plaintiff. Again, genuine issues of material fact 
exist as to this question, precluding granting either plaintiff 
or defendant's motion. Under the ADA, an employer must make 
reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee, unless the 
employer is able to demonstrate that such accommodation "would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business." 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). An accommodation is not reasonable if 
it eliminates a job's essential function. Rodal v. Anesthesia 
Grp. of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing
Shannon v. N.Y.C. Trans. Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir.
2003)). At trial, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing,
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with more than "mere speculation," "that 'an effective 
accommodation exist[ed] that would render her otherwise 
qualified.'" Jackan v. N.Y.S. Dept. of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 566 
(2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 
F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1995)). The NYCHRL defines a reasonable 
accommodation similarly to the ADA as one "that can be made that 
shall not cause undue hardship in the conduct of the covered 
entity's business." N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(18).
Neither party has put forth any admissible evidence 
regarding the specifics of any accommodations in plaintiff's 
previous job duties, why she could not have continued in that 
role, and whether any other reasonable accommodations existed at 
the relevant time. Plaintiff alleges, without specifying a time 
frame, that "[t]here were enough light duty assignments that 
Defendant Verizon could continue to employ Plaintiff in a light 
duty capacity as a technician," and cites to the affidavits of 
plaintiff and Raymond Spencer, a Verizon field technician who 
has been on medical leave since May of 2011. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 
27; see also Pl. Mem. 10-11.) Neither affidavit establishes 
that plaintiff or Mr. Spencer had personal knowledge of the 
existence of the light duty field technician jobs at Verizon.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) ("An affidavit or declaration used 
to support or oppose a motion [for summary judgment] must be 
made on personal knowledge"). Similarly, defendant also offers
25
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no admissible evidence at all about plaintiff's former position 
and why it is no longer available to her, stating only that 
light duty technicians no longer work at the Flatbush Extension.
(See Def. Rep. 56.1 Stmt. 5 23.) There is similarly no 
statement in the record by a Verizon employee with knowledge 
that would clarify or eliminate questions of fact about what 
positions are available and what burden, if any, accommodating 
plaintiff would create for defendant.
For the foregoing reasons, questions of fact remain 
about whether plaintiff's back injury was disabling under the 
ADA and whether the defendant could reasonably have accommodated 
her. These issues of face preclude summary judgment in favor of 
either the plaintiff or the defendant regarding plaintiff's 
alleged disability based on plaintiff's back condition.12
III. Plaintiff's Claims of Retaliation
For the reasons stated below, issues of fact preclude 
granting summary judgment in favor of either party on 
plaintiff's retaliation claims as they relate to her suspension, 
but summary judgment is granted in favor of defendant as to
12 Plaintiff also makes a separate claim that Verizon failed to engage in the 
interactive process contemplated by the ADA in order to determine whether an 
accommodation exists. The Second Circuit has concurred with other federal 
appellate courts that "failure to engage in an interactive process does not 
form the basis of an ADA claim in the absence of evidence that accommodation 
was possible." McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., Inc., 583 F.3d 92, 
100 (2d Cir. 2009) (collecting cases). In light of the lack of clarity in 
the record about whether a reasonable accommodation was available regarding 
plaintiff's alleged back condition, plaintiff, the court will not evaluate 
plaintiff's failure to engage in the interactive process claim at this time.
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plaintiff's claim that her current medical leave is retaliatory. 
Plaintiff's motion, insofar as it asserts that plaintiff was 
placed on medical leave in retaliation for activity protected 
under the ADA or NYCHRL, is denied.
The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to 
"discriminate against any individual because such individual has 
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or 
because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this chapter."13 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
For retaliation claims under the ADA, courts employ the same 
burden-shifting analysis used for discrimination claims. Muller 
v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 311 (2d Cir.1999) (citation omitted).
Thus, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation 
under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: "(1) the employee was 
engaged in an activity protected by the ADA, (2) the employer 
was aware of the activity, (3) an employment action adverse to
In the Amended Complaint, plaintiff makes a claim of retaliation under the 
New York City Human Rights Law only; however, in her summary judgment papers, 
she also makes her retaliation argument pursuant to the ADA. In general, a 
court need not consider those claims raised for the first time on summary 
judgment. See Lyman v. CSX Transp., Inc., 364 Fed. Appx. 699, 701 (2d Cir. 
2010) (citing Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 361 (2d Cir. 
2006); Syracuse Broad. Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1956); 5 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Produce § 1183, 
at 23 n.9 (3d ed. 2004)). The rationale for this rule is "to give defendants 
fair notice of the nature of the plaintiff's claim." Thomas v. Egan, 1 Fed.
Appx. 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Nonetheless, because the legal standard for
prohibited retaliation under the ADA and the NYCHRL are similar and because 
defendant addresses the ADA claim in its papers, the court will consider the 
question of retaliation under both the federal statute and city code.
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the plaintiff occurred, and (4) there existed a causal 
connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action." Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of 
retaliation, a presumption of retaliation arises and the burden 
shifts to defendants to show that the alleged adverse employment 
action was taken for legitimate, non-retaliatory 
reasons. See Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 
173 (2d Cir.2005). Finally, "once an employer offers such 
proof," the burden shifts back to plaintiff, who has the 
ultimate burden of showing that the proffered reasons are a 
pretext for retaliation. Id.
The NYCHRL similarly protects those who "oppose[] any 
practice forbidden under" the law or file a complaint from 
retaliation for those actions. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7).
As for discrimination claims, retaliation claims under the 
NYCHRL are evaluated under the same burden-shifting test as ADA 
claims; however, the court must bear in mind "the NYCHRL's 
'uniquely broad and remedial purposes,'" and, "in the 
retaliation context," may not "categorically reject[]" any "type 
of challenged conduct . . . as nonactionable." Williams, 836 F.
Supp. 2d at 171 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).
28
Case 1:11-cv-03758-KAM-LB Document 46 Filed 03/10/14 Page 29 of 33 PagelD  #:
<pageID>
Although the Amended Complaint and plaintiff's 
briefing are not clear, it appears that plaintiff considers two 
incidents to be retaliatory: 1) plaintiff's six-week suspension 
between October 21, 2010 and December 3, 2010, purportedly for a 
work time violation on October 18, 2010 for being off the job 
without management's permission (although plaintiff alleges that 
she was granted a previously approved vacation day on October 
18, 2010 for the time of her absence, she has submitted no 
admissible supporting documents and further asserts that she was 
in fact suspended for complaining about the fumes in the 
Flatbush Extension (Am. Compl. 5 36-37, 39)); and 2) plaintiff's 
current, involuntary medical leave "in retaliation for her 
complaints of discrimination," (Am. Compl. 5 43).
As a preliminary matter, the court finds, contrary to 
defendant's arguments in its briefing, that plaintiff did engage 
in protected activity prior to both her suspension and her 
medical leave. It is undisputed that prior to her medical 
leave, plaintiff requested ergonomic equipment and informed 
defendant that she was unable to work due to her back pain.
(Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 55 19-20.) It is also undisputed that plaintiff 
filed an incident report about the office fumigation on October 
17, 2010, prior to her suspension. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. 5 31.) 
Requests for disability accommodation and complaints, whether 
formal or informal, about working conditions related to one's
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alleged disability are protected activities. See, e.g., Treglia 
v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 720 (2d Cir. 2002); Pacheco v. 
Park S. Hotel, LLC, No. 12-CV-9127, 2014 WL 292348, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014); King v. Town of Wallkill, 302 F. Supp. 
2d 279, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
There are questions of fact in the record before the 
court as to whether plaintiff could establish a prima facie 
retaliation case under the ADA or NYCHRL at trial as to her 
suspension. Neither party has submitted any admissible evidence 
regarding the reason for plaintiff's suspension and neither 
party's explanation for the suspension is internally consistent. 
On one hand, defendant appears to concede at points in the 
record that plaintiff had vacation time and was not required to 
work on October 18, 2010, the day her absence led to her
suspension. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 17; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. 5 17.) 
On the other hand, plaintiff herself both asserts that on 
October 18, she had pre-authorized vacation time and that she 
reported to work but could not remain there (in contrast to 
defendant's assertion that she was absent). (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 
17; Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. 5 32.) Further, the parties agree that 
four months after the plaintiff's suspension, the Workers' 
Compensation Board ordered that plaintiff be compensated for her 
medical bills due to the fumigation (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 16; Def. 
Resp. 56.1 Stmt. 16). The Board's decision, however, indicates
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that plaintiff's lost time was not compensable because it was 
related to her suspension and not to any medical condition.
(Pl. Ex. 9.) In light of these contradictions and the general 
lack of admissible evidence regarding plaintiff's suspension, 
there remain issues of fact as to whether plaintiff's suspension 
was related to protected activity. As a result of these 
questions of fact, both plaintiff and defendant's motions are 
denied as to plaintiff's claim that her suspension was 
retaliatory.
Summary judgment is granted in favor of defendant as 
to plaintiff's claim that her current medical leave is 
retaliatory, and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on this 
issue is denied. Plaintiff states that her current medical 
leave constitutes retaliation because defendant has refused to 
allow her to return to work. (Am. Compl. 5 43.) There is no 
evidence in the record, however, that plaintiff has requested 
that she be reinstated as a field technician, or that Verizon 
has denied such request. To the contrary, plaintiff testified 
that she had not spoken to her managers about returning and 
instead simply communicated with Verizon's disability insurance 
company about her restrictions. (Gorbea Dep. Tr. at 93-94; see 
also Gorbea Dept. Tr. at 104.) She further testified that she 
had not sought out other roles at Verizon that would have suited 
her limitations. (Gorbea Dept. Tr. at 128-29.) There is, in
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sum, no evidence that plaintiff affirmatively sought and was 
denied an opportunity to return to work.
Although defendant moves for summary judgment on all 
of plaintiff's claims, defendant, in its briefing, focuses on 
the question of whether plaintiff engaged in protected activity, 
rather than whether, by remaining on medical leave, plaintiff 
was subject to a retaliatory action. Nonetheless, the court 
grants summary judgment on the basis of undisputed evidence that 
plaintiff requested medical leave and has not requested of her 
employer that she return to work, and thus, plaintiff was not 
barred by Verizon from doing so. Plaintiff has asserted, both 
in her own Rule 56.1 statement and in her responsive 56.1 
statement, that plaintiff has been refused the ability to return 
to work. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. 5 29; Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. 38, 40­
41.) She has, as detailed above, not supported that contention 
and has even eliminated any question of fact with her own 
testimony. (See, e.g., Gorbea Tr. at 93-94 (plaintiff's 
statement that she hasn't "spoken to managers" about returning 
to work).) See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.1(e)(3)-(4) ("If a party 
fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to 
properly address another party's assertion of fact . . ., the
court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and
supporting materials . . . show that the movant is entitled to
it; or issue any other appropriate order."). Summary judgment
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is therefore awarded to defendant on this portion of plaintiff's 
retaliation claim that defendant retaliated by refusing to allow 
her to return from medical leave.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, there are genuine 
issues of material fact regarding plaintiff's accommodation 
claim as to her back impairment and her retaliation claims as to 
her suspension. Therefore, both plaintiff and defendant's 
motions for summary judgment are denied on these issues, and 
defendant's motion is granted to the extent described in this 
order. The parties shall appear for a status conference on 
April 2, 2014 at 12pm to discuss pretrial matters and a May 
trial date.
SO ORDERED.
__________ /s/_________
Kiyo A. Matsumoto
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York 
March 10, 2014
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